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The Great Lakes can be classified as a  common property resource,
although consumptive water use from the  lakes  is,  at best,  "loosely"
managed.  Contributing to  the complexity of  the problem are the eight
U.S.  states,  two Canadian provinces, and two federal governments  involved
in managing the lakes.  At certain control points,  such as  the water
diversion out of Lake Michigan at Chicago and the  locks at  Sault St.
Marie, there  are specified rules and procedures for determining water
releases.  In contrast, there  is  little regulation of consumptive uses
from the lakes.  Thus  the problem is  two  fold:  (1)  there  is  no  single
entity in charge  of managing the  Great Lakes, and (2)  it  is  technically
difficult to  closely manage the  lake levels, particularly consumptive
uses.
This paper focuses on the management problems  involving water
diversions that are created by inter-dependencies  among water users.
What are the likely effects of different entities using the Great Lakes
when their use will have impacts  on other entities?  This  is  the classic
problem posed by open access resources or a common property resource with
inadequate institutional arrangements.  The Great Lakes  system  is
characterized by a situation where action by one state or users
influences other states or users.  Mohring and Boyd (1971)  called this
type of problem, "asset utilization".  That  is,  all  the  individuals
1utilize an asset where  there are no well-defined use,  in this case, water
withdrawal  from the Great Lakes.
Recent dry weather conditions show how rapidly  the  issues  concerning
lake levels and diversions can change.  In 1988,  the emphasis  abruptly
changed from a concern about high lake levels and shore  line erosions to
low lake levels  and the  impacts  of water diversions on hydropower
production and navigation.  During times  of high lake levels,  water
diversions would have mostly positive external effects  (reduce erosion).
However, if lake levels are  low, water diversions  could have significant
negative externalities through reductions  in hydropower production and
higher  shipping costs.
From the standpoint of water users in other river basins  (such as  the
lower Mississippi),  they wonder why a little more water cannot be released
through  the Chicago diversion during drought periods.  This would
supplement the river flow on the  Illinois  and lower Mississippi Rivers  and
improve navigation.  Such an increase was widely discussed during the  1988
drought, but was not supported by most Great Lakes states and provinces.
Would this situation change  if the  lower Mississippi river basin states
were willing to  pay Illinois to  allow more water to be released, and would
there be  anything wrong with allowing the  sale?  The answer  is  both
political and economic and involves  the  interdependency of users and the
possible impacts  on water users  in the Great Lakes.
Model of  Interdependencies
Suppose  there are N exploiters on the  lake.  Each  one of them can
extract qi  from the  lake.  All  the other  factors are  conditionally
2optimized, thus  production yi can be represented as  a function of qi
alone:
Yi  " f(qi) Vi-l,...,N  (1)
The cost function, however, is  a function of both qi and the  lake
level L:
Ci - Ci  (qi,L)  (2)
The interdependence can be demonstrated by comparing the  equilibrium
water withdrawals when no well-defined property rights  exist, with the
case where withdrawals  are determined by a social planner  (sole owner).
The  first equilibrium is  derived by solving the following
maximization problem:
n  = p.f(qi)  - Ci(qi,L)  (3)
where p is  the output price.  The first order condition for  this
maximization problem is:
a3  _p *  f(qai)  aC(qi.L ) (4)
8qi  aqi aqi
or
p  af(qil  =  aCilqi L)(5)
aqi qi
However,  (5) is  not a socially optimal solution, since  lake levels
are an argument in the objective  function over which players have no
control.
The  social planner problem  (sole owner)  is  given by the following
objective  function:
Max.n - errt  [p.f(qi)  - Ci(qi,L)]dt  (6)
Jo  i=l
s.t.  n
L  =  Rt(L) - Zqi
where r - social discount rate,  Rt = recharge rate  of water into  the
3lakes,  and L - change in lake level.
This  intertemporal problem can be  solved by formulating the following
current value Hamiltonian:
n  n
H - [p  f(qi)  - Ci  (qiL)] - 8(t)[F(L) - qi]  (7) i-i  i-1
where Q(t)  is  the co-state variable.
The  first order condition with respect  to qi  is  given by:
aH - p · *  f(qil - aCiqi.L) - 6(t) = 0  (8)
aqi  aqi  aqi
or:
P *  f(qi)  = aCiqiL)  + E(t)  (9)
aqi  8 qi
Thus, we see that under the  common property equilibrium, players  fail
to  take into  account  the additional cost Q(t).  This difference is  the
user cost  or the value of an additional unit of lake level or the  future
cost saving that is  lost because water  is used now.  At a social optimum,
the value of the marginal water unit as  a flow and as a stock must be
equal.
Once a steady state  is reached under both situations,  the withdrawal
rates will be  the  same and equal to  inflow, otherwise the equation of
motion is violated.  Yet lake  levels will be higher under the  social
optimum equilibrium as  compared to open access.  This can be  seen by
comparing equations  (5) and (9)  where the difference  is  the user cost
caused by differences  in lake levels.
Factors  limiting overuse
There are several  factors which limit the overuse of the Great Lakes.
The  first mitigating factor  is  the number of firms  that surround the
4lakes.  The previous analysis  is accurate only if N approaches a.  If
not, notice in equation  (3) that a firm's decision will affect  its  profit
through the L variable.  As N approaches a, the effect of a firm's
withdrawal upon its own profits  (through lower lake levels) approaches
an:
zero.  Assuming  that aL  > 0 and N < a, the private firms will have an
incentive to withdraw less  than is  suggested by equation (5).
The expectations of each decision maker regarding the  other players
(firms) may limit the amount withdrawn from  the  lakes.  Notice that  this
situation can be  formulated as  a game, with N identical firms and each
one choosing qi as  its  decision variable.  The aggregate withdrawal
N
is  given therefore by:  Q -il  qi.  If we  denote the withdrawal of
the others besides  i by Q-i -j  qj  then:  Q = qi + Q-i.
Total cost to  each player is  given by:
TCi - TCi(qi, Q, L) - qi.A  (Q,L)  (10)
where A is  the external effect caused by the overall withdrawals on the
lake  level.
The marginal cost is  therefore:
aT  = qi  aQ  * a·  + A (Q,L) - MCi (11)
using the symmetry property we get:
MCi - .N  *  · a  *  + A(Q,L)  (12) N  aQ  aqi
Every exploiter faces  the following maximization problem:
max.  Hi = qi  [P  - A(Q,L)]  (13)
qi
s.t.
qi + Q.i  L
qi 2 0
5for every time period.
A Nash equilibrium occurs  if each player treats the other player's
actions as given and maximizes his or her profits with regard to  only his
or her actions.  In our case, this  is  done with respect  to qi  and not to
Q-i.
However, a more realistic assumption is  to use  a non-Nash behavior.
A non-Nash solution is characterized by a non-zero conjectural variation
with respect to the effect that one agent expects his or her own behavior
to have on the other player's activities.  In our case, agent i expects
a--i  to be other than zero.  We are especially interested in the  case
aqi
where this term is  greater  than zero.  That means that player  i expects
that his  or her activity will cause the other players  to  increase their
activity.  If we assume  in addition that:  ai- <  0, then qi under this
kind of expectation will be smaller than  in the Nash case.  This  follows
because  it shows that each firm, by taking into account  the other firms'
reaction, will not divert as  much as when the other firms  are assumed not
to  react.  The self-limiting behavior reduces the negative externalities
since  it shifts  the solution towards  the socially optimum withdrawal and
resulting lake levels.
Another factor  that may limit the amount of water diverted is  the
element of reciprocity  (see Sugden, 1984).  Over use  of the resource
arises partly because of the uncertainty concerning what other states will
do.  This  is  the reason that the  shared cost  is commonly ignored.  If,
however, a system of conditional commitments can be  established, we can
move toward the socially optimum withdrawal and lake level.  Assurance
concerning the action of other states and provinces  is  needed,
6nevertheless,  to achieve  these coordinated activities.  A conditional
commitment occurs when others are contributing, and individual group
members  feel obligated to  contribute the  same  (see Runge, 1984).
An excellent example of this  kind of conditional commitment is  the
Great Lakes Charter that was signed by the eight Governors of the Great
Lakes  states and the Premiers of  the  two Canadian Great Lakes provinces.
The Charter states  that no diversion or  other new consumptive use above  a
given level will be allowed unless  all eight states and two provinces have
given their permission.  However, it  is  not binding until enacted into
law by each individual state and province.  The primary reason for abiding
by the Charter appears to  be the reciprocity element.  The existence of
this  Charter is  purely dependent on the assurance  the states receive  from
this kind of policy.  The policy has more chance of surviving if the
impacts on all  states and provinces  are similar,  i.e.,  the  impacts should
be similar  for them to all enact the Charter.  So  far,  four states and  the
two provinces have essentially enacted the Charter's provisions.  Only
Michigan, Indiana and Pennsylvania have not taken action.  New York tried
to pass the needed legislation in 1987, but failed  [Frerichs and Easter].
The lack of homogenous impacts may explain the  difference in
legislative response.  States  that need the water as  a stock (for
navigation and hydropower purposes) are not the  same states that have an
incentive to withdraw the water.  The  state of Illinois, for example, has
an incentive  in drought  times  to  divert water from Lake Michigan to  the
Chicago and Illinois rivers in order to  raise their  flows.  Transportation
and hydropower production on the Chicago and Illinois  rivers are  important
to  the state's economy, as  is  the water disposal  function of the rivers.
7Other states do not have the same  incentive, and especially not during
drought periods, when the lake levels are  low enough without increasing
the Chicago diversion.  There  is  also a much lower concern about lake
levels in states such as  Indiana and Pennsylvania, which have only a
small amount of shoreline and lake use.  Michigan is  the only state whose
lack of legislative action, in regard to  the Charter,  is hard to explain.
They would seem to have the most to  lose from increased water transfers.
Options  for Regulating Water Use
If open access to  the Great Lakes  causes overuse of  the lake water,
as  shown in figure  1, can government action bring about  an improvement?
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Figure 1:  Optimum Withdrawals from the Great Lakes
8The horizontal axis  (q) represents withdrawals from the Great Lakes at
the margin, while the vertical axis shows  the costs.  With free access,
the  firms will withdraw water until the average  cost of diverting one more
unit of water will be equal to  the marginal revenue  (which is  constant and
equals  to p in our case).  This will result  in Qfa being diverted, while
the optimal amount of water  to divert  is Q* where MC-p.  The  loss because
of excessive withdrawals  is given by  ABC.
Is Q* preferable to  Qfa?  The answer depends upon the expense
required to  reach Q*.  Will the Charter's provisions, if adopted by all
eight states, improve water use  in the Great Lakes  and move withdrawal to
Q*?  If enforced, the Charter provisions would essentially stop any new
water diversions  and limit other major new consumptive uses.  This would
improve water use  only if the current  levels of use  are near to  or above
the optimum level of consumption,  i.e.,  Qfa.  If it  is below the  optimum
level of consumption,  the Charter could cause  losses  in benefits that
exceed any cost savings.
Another alternative would be a tax equal  to  the marginal user cost,
which is  given in figure  1 by BD.  This will result  in equilibrium at Q*
and tax revenues of BDEP.  If the  tax payments collected by the monitoring
agency are not distributed back in some  form, it will result  in a net
welfare  loss  to  each of the resource users--that  is,  the area BDEP is
greater  than ABC  (for a proof, see Weitzman, 1974).  If redistribution of
taxes  are  considered, they should not be connected to  the amount diverted,
otherwise  the  tax program will not provide an incentive  to  reduce
diversions  at the margin.
9In contrast to  the  tax solution, efficient quotas  (property rights
to divert water) can result in the benefits to the users,  if quotas  are
assigned such that the marginal social cost of diverting one more unit of
water  is equal among all users.  This would be possible, however, only in
the case  of identical users of  the lakes.  Otherwise, opposition can be
expected from various  groups of users who receive lower quotas  than
others.
A new approach is  to  control water use with a marketable permit
system (see Tietenberg,  1980).  The advantage of this  system is  that  it
can provide cost-effective solutions for a given lake level.  However,
there  is a possibility that some resource users will be worse off under
this management policy than under one where no property rights  are
assigned  (free access).  This may be why New York and Michigan have not
approved the Charter and suggests that they would oppose a permit system.
Benefits and Costs  of Regulation
The benefits and costs  to  the different  states and provinces  are not
only a function of  their decision concerning how much to  divert or
consume, but  is  also dependent on what other parties do on the lake.  The
additional  costs imposed on other parties  comes, primarily, from losses
to hydropower production and commercial navigation while shoreline
property probably benefits from lower lake levels.  The major loser from a
large diversion would be  the hydropower  industry, which would suffer a
loss of  about $10  million per 1 inch drop in the  lake level.  An
additional 1 million dollars will be lost by the navigation industry on
the lakes  (David, et. al.,  1988).  This total cost will be slightly
reduced by the benefit to  shoreline property.
10Depending on how the diverted water is used, its value can range  from
$10  to $400 per ac.  ft.  The  only feasible uses  for large quantities of
water appear  to be irrigation, and, in dry years, navigation.
Agriculture, however, cannot pay much more than $50  per ac.  ft.  for
imported water.  The only users that can pay prices high enough to cover
the $200-$300/ac.ft. cost of new water diversions  are municipalities and
hydropower producers  (Buckley, et.  al.,  1984,  David, et.  al.,  1988).
Thus,  from an economic stand point, new large water diversions  should not
be tried.
However, political considerations and  the unequal distribution of
costs and benefits from water diversions keep  the option open.  While
navigation is  spread more or  less  equally around the Lakes,  the
hydropower  is mainly located in two states  (Michigan and New York) and the
two Canadian provinces  (Ontario and Quebec).  These parties will put more
weight on water as  a stock rather than as  a flow commodity to be  sold.
This  raises the question of who gets paid for the diverted water,  since
not all lake states have similar interests.  States that do not own
hydropower facilities  and want to sell water face only  the commercial
navigation damage, which is not high  for an individual  state.  Thus,  they
can reap much of the benefit from a water sale, while imposing most of the
external  costs on others.
Downstream users, especially New York and Quebec, cannot  affect the
upper stream users without some kind of a well-established agency to
monitor diversions.  The results appear  to be biased significantly in
favor of the U.S.  states, especially those on the western Great Lakes, who
do not use hydropower facilities  as  an energy source.  They are the  ones
11most likely to  pursue water diversions.  Yet contrary to expectations, the
three western most states have already implemented the Charter provisions
to  control consumptive water use and transfers.
Conclusions
The outcome under free access is  just one possibility;  it  is  the
upper boundary of the  inefficiency.  However, the number of users  is
finite and the user expectations do not necessarily form a Nash solution.
In fact, the Great Lakes  experience would suggest this  is the case,  as  the
western Great Lake  states and provinces have taken the lead in opposing
diversions  out of the  lakes and supporting the Charter.  Support for the
Charter  is beneficial to  the Great Lakes  States as  long as  current
withdrawals are at or  above the optimum level.
However, whether or not withdrawals are near optimum in the Great
Lakes cannot be ascertained, given our state of knowledge.  To determine
this,  research is  needed concerning the aggregate and individual  firm
demand curves  for water from the Great Lakes.  This will be dependent on
what additional sources of water are available,  the technical water needs
and any government water conservation policies that may be  implemented
(demand management).  With this  information and different assumptions
concerning lake water supplies, estimates can be made concerning the
optimum water withdrawals  from the Great Lakes.
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